American think tank: Washington’s allies in East Asia will not stand against China

According to Isna, the American think tank points out in a recent article that an increasing number of American policymakers want the formation of a large coalition under the leadership of the United States in Asia against China, but Washington’s main allies in the region are not interested in this coalition.

The American think tank “Quincy Institute for Responsible Governance” writes in this article that Japan, South Korea, the Philippines and Australia are supposed to be the core of such a coalition, and its most important security function will be to prevent China from a possible attack on Taiwan. The article also emphasizes that the new “national security strategy” of the US President Donald Trump’s administration has explicitly supported this plan.

A sham alliance in the face of Beijing

However, Quincy explains, the main problem with this plan is that America’s Asian allies do not show unified support for it. Japan is somewhat close to Washington’s point of view and even the country’s new prime minister hinted that Tokyo might intervene militarily if China attacks Taiwan. But despite these statements, Japanese public opinion is still hesitant to participate in the defense of Taiwan.

Quincy also notes that Australia and the Philippines are more willing to cooperate than other allies, but that cooperation is mostly defined in terms of defending their territory or providing non-combat support. Public opinion in Australia is also highly distrustful of America; Especially during the Trump presidency. These differences show that Washington’s desired coalition does not have the necessary cohesion.

According to Quincy, South Korea is more reluctant than any of America’s allies in the region to join a coalition against China. Successive governments in South Korea have tried to carefully adjust their position between Washington and Beijing. Despite the widespread support of South Korean public opinion for Seoul’s alliance with Washington and increasing negative views of China, South Koreans still want to maintain a “diplomatic balance” between the US and China, rather than overtly siding with Washington.

Quincy then details the meeting of the Quincy delegation with former and current South Korean officials, think tanks, academics, risk analysts and journalists in Seoul. Although these people assess China’s growing power and influence as a “long-term challenge”, they are very cautious about confronting China or participating in a military alliance, especially regarding Taiwan. They have repeatedly emphasized that South Korea should avoid being caught in a difficult choice between Beijing and Washington.

To explain this conservative approach, the American think tank points to the following reasons: extensive economic dependence on China, declining trust in the credibility of the United States after Trump took office, the reluctance of South Korean public opinion towards Taiwan, and the concern that intervention in the Taiwan crisis could destabilize the Korean Peninsula or provoke North Korea. Quincy emphasizes that South Korean public opinion has “almost no desire” to go to war with China over Taiwan, and expects the US to handle the issue with more restraint.

Pointless queuing or deterrence diplomacy?

Another important part of the article deals with the discussion of “strategic flexibility”; That is, the policy that determines the extent to which American forces stationed in Korea can participate in missions outside the peninsula; including in Taiwan. This report explains that in 2006, under strong pressure from Washington, Seoul accepted that US forces can play a role in regional crises under certain circumstances, but only on the condition that the security of South Korea is not jeopardized and does not contradict the will of the people of this country.

The article points out that even despite the recent tripartite statements between the US, South Korea and Japan about “peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait”, Seoul has still refused to provide any clear explanation on how it will react in the event of a possible war in Taiwan. According to this think tank, part of the concern is whether the US will expect South Korea to provide “support” or send air assets from Korean soil to Taiwan, and whether such an action will provoke China to attack US bases in Korea or not.

Quincy concludes that South Korea’s disagreement, ambiguity, and deep doubts show that Washington’s plan to create a large anti-China coalition will not materialize in the near future, and Washington should consider diplomatic strategies to reduce the possibility of conflict with China instead of relying on mere deterrence.

In the end, the American think tank described the possibility of forming such a coalition as “unrealistic” and wrote: “It is better for Washington to stop promoting a huge coalition against China.”

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