Ukraine’s hardest wier – ISNA
Poiing out that Ukraine and Russia-both have shown signs of fatigue as the fourth year of the war approaches, the American media examined the advaages and disadvaages of the parties’ performance and wrote: Despite the fact that Russia is a year behind its plan to take corol of the logistics city of Pokrovsk, it is consolidating its positions in this city and advancing its operations.
According to Isna, Russia had planned to capture the city of Pokrovsk, which is a logistics hub in the Donetsk region, by November 2024. Russian forces are one year behind schedule. Ukrainian forces, although severely outnumbered, have fought stubbornly to maiain the defense line of Donbass; Now, Russia appears to be on the verge of consolidating its corol over Pokrovsk, as it has deployed more troops and Russian drones have cut off the Ukrainian military’s access to supplies and resupply.
“Foreign Affairs” magazine, considering the developmes in the field and the support from Kiev, in a report examined the prospects of this war and a possible ceasefire and wrote: “Pokrovsk is not an isolated battle. Russian forces are gradually encircling the positions of Ukraine in the north and south and have reached the outskirts of “Kostainivka”. Rece advances to the north along the Dnipro River have put the economic ceer of Zaporizhia at risk. If Donbas falls, Kharkiv – the second largest city in Ukraine – will be in danger.”
In the coinuation of this article, referring to the iensification of Russia’s offensive operations in Ukraine, it is stated: “As this war approaches its fourth year, both sides have shown signs of fatigue, but none of them are ready for peace.” Putin has not made any concessions in terms of his demands, despite America’s advance in diplomatic efforts for mohs.
Russian army rocket attack towards an unspecified position in Ukraine, October 31, 2025
Three stages of realizing Russia’s strategic goals in Ukraine and its challenges
The author believes: “The reduction of American military-technical assistance has created the hope in the Kremlin that it can have the upper hand against Ukraine.” Meanwhile, Europe’s focus on what to do after the ceasefire with the “coalition of the willing” that has promised to send troops to Ukraine has made prolonging the war the best tool for Russia to preve Ukraine from iegrating io the European security structure.
Russia now sees its strategic objective against Ukraine in three phases, only the first of which involves actual combat. Primarily, Russia seeks to occupy or destroy enough Ukrainian territory to ensure that what remains is economically viable only with Russia’s conse. Russian planners estimate that this can be achieved if the four previously annexed provinces are acquired, plus Kharkiv, Mykolaiv and Odessa. In such a situation, the Kremlin will seek a ceasefire. Of course, with the belief that he can follow the second stage, in which he will use economic leverage and political warfare, backed by the threat of another attack, to exert corol over Kyiv. In the third stage, Russia will attract Ukraine io its orbit in a similar way to Belarus.
The American media coinued to write: “In order to maiain the curre pace of offensive operations, the Kremlin needs to either find a way to advance the battles that preserves the lives of its soldiers more or find a new model for recruitme.”
At the same time, Russia’s curre working capital determines its ability to sustain offensive operations; As long as Russia can sell oil, gas, and other raw materials, it has the means to generate cash for weapons and recruiting. But the drop in oil prices in 2025 has reduced Russia’s reserves. Meanwhile, Ukraine’s expanding campaign of long-range attacks on oil refineries has created problems for domestic oil refining and fuel availability.
Russian air defense has so far been able to defeat 95% of Ukrainian drones, and due to the low explosive power of Ukrainian ammunition, only about half of the drones that reach the target have really caused significa damage. However, Ukraine is stockpiling domestically designed cruise missiles.
A view of the ruins in the city of Pokrovsk
A major obstacle to persuading Russia to stop the war
Foreign Affairs wrote in another part of this report: “While Ukraine is thinking about the fourth wier of war, its ability to resist Russia will depend on three basic factors: equipme and ammunition, manpower and will.” The task of providing the necessary ammunition for the coinuation of the war for the armed forces of Ukraine is now on the shoulders of Europe. This is a mission that European governmes have shown their commitme to, and the promises of European leaders about investing in defense production have finally come true. Production of ammunition, as well as subsystems for cruise missiles, drones and other weapons, is expanding, although production of air defense systems remains in short supply.
America has practically stopped supplying equipme to Ukraine. The key question is whether the Trump administration will reliably authorize the purchase of US-made weapons in those areas that Ukraine’s iernational partners do not have the domestic capacity to produce, particularly Patriot air defense systems, multiple guided missile systems, 155mm laser-guided munitions, and other specialized military items such as F-16 spare parts. “Ukraine’s equipme situation is precarious but manageable with proper investme.”
Addressing the shortage of Ukrainian manpower, this report wrote: The number of combat-ready infary in the Ukrainian Armed Forces has been decreasing for almost two years. At some poi, this number will reach a level that will make it impossible to hold the fro, unless Kiev’s approach to force formation changes.
Collecting people from the street has been challenging, but the main problem is improving the quality and capacity of training and iegrating Ukrainian infary io combat brigades. The army is unable to train its personnel to perform combat duties on the fro line. “To solve this problem, the new Ukrainian Army Corps needs to rotate brigades and allow better units to help train weaker units.”
In the same vein, the American media wrote about the obstacles to the training of Ukrainian forces by its partners and the deployme of support forces in Ukraine: “There is a better model for European training aid – a model that may also prepare the ground for an eveual ceasefire.” Europe’s post-war security commitmes have become a major obstacle to persuading Russia to end the war, giving Russia a strong inceive to avoid a ceasefire.
The best way to overcome this obstacle is to completely separate the issue of the deployme of European forces in Ukraine from the issue of the ceasefire.
Ukrainian forces operating in Zaporizhia, October 2025
This wier can be a turning poi
Foreign Affairs wrote in the final part of this article: Russia is producing more missiles than ever before, and meanwhile, Ukraine’s damaged energy grid is now unable to supply electricity to the eire coury. Even the ceer of Kyiv does not have electricity for several hours every day. Currely, the heating system is working, but temperatures are dropping and Ukraine should prepare for significa disruption of water, electricity and heating services during the cold mohs. If Russia can accelerate its advance, perhaps through a combination of clearing Ukrainian defense lines and depopulating major ceers near the fro, it could pave the way to force Ukraine to surrender in 2026.
But this is by no means a definite result. If Ukraine can join forces with Western powers to put real pressure on Russia’s economy and energy infrastructure, a ceasefire may be within reach by the end of next year.
However, Washington should know that a ceasefire will not be achieved with symbolic gestures and concessions to Moscow. But Ukraine cannot resist indefinitely.”
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